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ABSTRACT
The Internet and the World Wide Web have become integral
parts of the lives of many modern individuals, enabling al-
most instantaneous communication, sharing and broadcast-
ing of thoughts, feelings and opinions. Much of this infor-
mation is publicly facing, and as such, it can be utilised
in a multitude of online investigations, ranging from em-
ployee vetting and credit checking to counter-terrorism and
fraud prevention/detection. However, the search needs and
behaviours of these investigators are not well documented
in the literature. In order to address this gap, an in-depth
qualitative study was carried out in cooperation with a lead-
ing investigation company. The research contribution is an
initial identification of Open-Source Intelligence investiga-
tor search behaviours, the procedures and practices that
they undertake, along with an overview of the di culties
and challenges that they encounter as part of their domain.
This lays the foundation for future research in to the varied
domain of Open-Source Intelligence gathering.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
H.3.3 [Information Storage and Retrieval]: Information
Search and Retrieval: Users and interactive retrieval: Task
models; H.3.3 [Information Storage and Retrieval]: In-
formation Search and Retrieval:Specialized information re-
trieval: Web and social media search; H.3.4 [Information
Storage and Retrieval]: Systems and Software: Perfor-
mance Evaluation
General Terms
Human Factors
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1. INTRODUCTION
The ubiquity of Internet access has transformed many
facets of modern society, substantially changing how we com-
municate and share information. Social media platforms,
blogging sites and messaging services allow individuals to
broadcast their thoughts or otherwise express themselves
online. A by-product of this is that we e↵ectively publish
a great deal of biographical information on the World Wide
Web, potentially making it freely available to anyone wish-
ing to look for it. Studies of Web search logs indicate that
somewhere between 4% [24] and 10% [13] of Web searches
contain the name of a person, suggesting that there is some
degree of public interest in seeking this type of informa-
tion. Indeed, there are specialised search engines built for
the purpose of finding people on the Web [28]. Regardless of
whether the search is conducted from a specialised or gen-
eral Web search engine, most queries pertain to low profile
individuals, as opposed to celebrities [24, 28].
Social media appears to play a large role in person searches,
with data showing that 66% of outclicks on a person search
engine lead to social media profiles [28]. These profiles of-
fer insights in to peoples lives which may not be available
via traditional means [6]. Additionally, social media users
openly share sensitive information, one striking example of
which is the prevalence of gang promotion by young gang
members [33]. Despite this, only 1 in 4 users of the social
media platform Facebook adopt restrictive privacy settings
[7], such that this information may be publicly available –
though these policies in themselves do not completely pre-
vent information being gathered about the user [1, 16].
In the intelligence community, intelligence gathered from
open data sources is referred to as Open-Source Intelligence
(OSINT)1. Information discovered from these sources, which
includes publicly available social media information, may be
utilised for a variety of purposes. In some cases, it may be
used illegitimately, such as for stalking [1], terrorism [9],
1
‘Open-Source” refers to availability of the information to the public,
as opposed to a software licensing philosophy.
or identify theft [10]. However, with the appropriate le-
gal and ethical considerations [1, 21], these sources may be
exploited in legitimate OSINT investigations, examples of
which pertain to: employee vetting [5, 12], fraud detection
[26], counter-terrorism [9] and gang violence [33].
The types of information sought after, as well as their
uses, vary depending on the context of the investigation.
Ultimately, the information is collected in order to fulfil a
specific task. An example of this would be vetting an appli-
cant for a high profile legal position. In this case, it is pru-
dent to conduct criminal background checks, as well as to
inquire as to the general nature, behaviour and disposition
of the individual, as to avoid future scandal. The former
tasks may focus on finding news articles and legal docu-
ments, while social media and other communication plat-
forms can be leveraged to assess the individual’s character.
These findings may provide good reason to reject the appli-
cant, or provide support for their application. In the case of
terrorist investigations, personal conduct is viewed in a dif-
ferent context, with the social element emphasising related
individuals. Who are they talking to? What are they say-
ing? How are they communicating? Where do they go and
what do they do? This type of inquiry could result in the
discovery that the subject associates with known terrorists,
or openly posts information relating to extremist websites.
In the case of a potential corporate merger, it may be pru-
dent to investigate the track record of the company and its
executives. Public business records could be utilised in this
case, which may uncover a long line of failed business, sug-
gesting that this merger would be unwise. In all cases, vast
arrays of open data sources can be leveraged in order to
determine a course of action or support/refute a particular
assertion.
In this paper we explore a subset of OSINT investiga-
tions which focus on collecting publicly available information
about individuals. In order to examine investigator search
behaviours and identify generalisable search requirements in
this domain, an in-depth qualitative study was conducted
utilising several analysts from a well-established company.
Due to the sensitive nature of this line of work, and to pro-
tect the confidentiality of the company and ongoing investi-
gations, all examples provided in this paper are conceptually
representative of actual cases but are entirely anonymised.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Sec-
tion 2 explores previous work on domain specific search and
the behaviour of intelligence analysts. Section 3 describes
the methodology used to capture the search behaviour of
sampled users in this search domain, in addition to a descrip-
tion of the questionnaire used as part of the semi-structured
interviews. Findings are presented in Section 4, which de-
scribes the process involved, as well as search behaviour,
tools used and di culties encountered in these online inves-
tigations. Section 5 compares and contrasts the findings of
this research to previous work, with a summary and future
work in Section 6.
2. BACKGROUND
In this section, we will provide a brief overview of the
di↵erent search behaviours observed in di↵erent domains,
as well as previous work on the behaviour of intelligence
analysts, in order to provide context for future discussion.
Di↵erent search domains have di↵erent properties and dif-
ferent user/system requirements, an examination of which
allows for the development of more e↵ective domain spe-
cific search tools [14]. For this reason, substantial research
has been conducted in order to characterise the ubiquitous
Web search domain – a survey of which can be found in
Markey [20]. This previous work has shown that the aver-
age Web user engages in short search sessions, poses short
queries, makes minimal use of advanced search functional-
ity/relevance feedback, and typically only reviews one-to-
two pages of results [25, 20]. In essence, Web users desire
immediate satisfaction for minimal e↵ort [15], i.e. they ap-
pear to subscribe to Zipf’s Principle of Least E↵ort [35].
In contrast to general Web searching, some domains are
characterised by the need to conduct exhaustive, time con-
suming, searches [15]. Some instances of exhaustive search
are so large scale that they occupy multiple searchers for
months at a time [2]. In exhaustive search, the goal is to
find all documents which are relevant to the given informa-
tion need, such that high recall is emphasised. In the patent
search domain [17], this is especially important as failing to
find a relevant document may have significant legal reper-
cussions. Perhaps as a result of this, patent searchers place
greater emphasis on search control, utilising more advanced
search functionality [17]. This high recall requirement also
appears to be a feature of the E-Discovery domain [2], where
extensive document review is cited as being the primary
investigative overhead. Conversely, searches conducted by
software engineers [11] have relatively few relevant results,
with queries containing many technical terms and acronyms.
Users in this domain also place a strong emphasis on the au-
thority of the source, which is derived from document meta-
data, such as site reputation, author and publish date.
Several works have focused on identifying di↵erences be-
tween the behaviour of experts and non-experts. White and
Morris [31] found that those with search expertise submit
fewer queries, spend more time searching, and make more
use of advanced search functionality. Additionally, these
users also exhibit a higher degree of discrimination when
viewing the results page, viewing fewer documents, spend-
ing less time reviewing each document, and clicking on lower
ranked results.
When the emphasis is shifted from search expertise to
domain expertise/knowledge, findings are similar with re-
gards to query and session length, with the addendum that
a higher number of unique sites are visited by domain ex-
perts [29, 30]. This suggests that experts are typically more
invested in the outcome of the search process, even when the
domain does not necessarily require exhaustive methodolo-
gies. In addition, experts have been shown to prefer more
technical sources [29], while non-experts frequent commer-
cial and consumer orientated sites [29, 30]. Liu et al. [18]
also suggest that users with high domain knowledge attempt
to leverage their expertise to extract information from indi-
rect sources for easy tasks, rather than attempting to locate
documents which are more concise and to the point. Sim-
ilarly, Bhavnani [4] has shown that domain experts iden-
tify and utilise a variety of authoritative sources, while non-
experts rely on general Web search engines. Further, it was
demonstrated that those with domain expertise appear to
have some high level understanding of the search process for
the task at hand, while non-experts do not. Regardless of
whether the di↵erence in expertise is search or domain spe-
cific, experts typically perform more e↵ective searches than
non-experts [4, 30, 31].
Domain specific or technical vocabulary appears to be an
important element of domain specific search, with experts
using more of these terms per query than non-experts [29,
30], while also selecting query concepts more e↵ectively [32].
The use of this vocabulary can be acquired by non-experts
over time [27, 30]. However, Vakkari et al. [27] suggest that
there is a minimum threshold of search competency which
must be met, for a boolean search system, before an ex-
tended vocabulary can be e↵ectively utilised.
Intelligence Analysis.
Intelligence analysts are tasked with fusing multiple, di-
verse, streams of data in order to rapidly arrive at a conclu-
sion, often without a well defined starting point for the anal-
ysis [34]. This section first describes the recommended ap-
proach to Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) searching and
analysis, before discussing previous work relating to the be-
haviour of closed intelligence analysts.
OSINT investigations begin with the communication of
an information need, with the first step being to identify
potential sources of information which fulfil this need. The
sources utilised for criminal inquiries will di↵er from those
used for planning humanitarian aid, or assessing the dam-
age done by a natural disaster. At this point, data collection
is strategic, in that the search sources are chosen based on
potential return on time invested, with the disclosure of find-
ings focusing on addressing the given task [22]. The steps
involved in the tactical collection of data are critical, as the
volume of information available online is vast, and the an-
alyst could easily be overwhelmed. Time management and
prioritisation is therefore paramount if the OSINT analyst is
to be e↵ective. Additionally, subtasks may be automated in
order to save large quantities of time [1, 22]. Appel [1] likens
the process to playing slot machines at a casino, where, after
a point, there is more to be lost than to be gained. Other
concerns for OSINT searching may also include the relative
freshness of the information, particularly with tasks relat-
ing to breaking news or events [3], or concerns over digital
footprints which could potentially tip o↵ a subject [22].
Chin et al. [8] analysed the behaviour of national security
intelligence analysts by exposing five of them, each with pre-
vious intelligence or military experience, to two mock cases
which were created by a sixth analyst. Several analysis tech-
niques were discovered, not all of which are compatible. A
popular strategy is to map all pieces of evidence to all pos-
sible hypotheses in order to determine which is the most
likely. However, one analyst disagreed with this approach,
as it may cause data to be interpreted in such a way as to
fit a particular hypothesis. Another scheme involved inter-
preting the evidence in terms of high level attributions, such
as intent and motivation. Irrespective of the strategy, a key
feature of the analysis is that it is iterative; new questions
are derived from viewed documents. Analysts described this
iteration as never being finished, such that arbitrary dead-
lines are required to produce results in a timely fashion. As
a result of this, analysts developed varying document pri-
oritisation and triage approaches, primarily involving phys-
ical copies of documents. Analysts were not found to use
any specialised software tools when identifying patterns in
the data, instead opting to use Microsoft O ce products to
map out relations. Additionally, varying levels of credibility
are assigned to the findings, with facts not necessarily being
considered to be “concrete truths” [8].
Pirolli and Card [23] conducted a cognitive task analy-
sis and think aloud study with intelligence analysts in or-
der to identify leverage points for future improvement. The
authors characterise analyst behaviour as a kind of expert
behaviour, where existing schemas are built from experience
and applied to new scenarios. The process was characterised
in terms of two primarily loops, an information foraging loop
and a sensemaking loop. Foraging involves searching for in-
formation, filtering documents and reading the documents
with the goal of extracting information. Sensemaking in-
volves the iterative development of a mental model, with
the conceptualisation of a schema which fits the evidence.
At each stage there is potential for feedback between the
various sub-tasks, both inter- and intra-loop. These loops
can be used to support both bottom-up (data to theory)
or top-down (theory to data) models, with the authors sug-
gesting that either model can be invoked depending on the
task at hand. Key leverage points were found in both loops.
The foraging loop contains typical precision-recall trade-o↵s
as analysts move from a larger set of documents to a more
narrow one. Individual cognitive loads in this loop are as-
sociated with scanning, reading and extracting information
from documents, as well as those associated with the iter-
ative process in follow-up queries. Leverage points in the
sensemaking process include the attention span available for
the evidence and hypotheses, as well as the generation of
alternative hypotheses while avoiding confirmation bias.
3. METHODOLOGY
While previous work addresses a wide range of search do-
mains, there is a lack of research into the search behaviour
of OSINT investigators. However, the potential use cases for
open-source information are varied, such that it is di cult
to address the entire domain at once. The processes in-
volved in capturing information relating to natural disasters
or breaking news is likely quite di↵erent to those used for
employee background investigations. For this reason, this
research focuses on a subset of OSINT use cases, subject
centric investigations, where the primary focus is on gather-
ing information about a single individual.
In order to gain insight in to these types of investiga-
tions, an in depth exploratory study was conducted with a
leading investigation company. This involved input from a
total of three participants over two stages: i) an initial in-
terview with a company executive and ii) semi-structured
interviews [19] with two analysts who carry out the Web
searching for the investigations. Intelligence analysis and
personal investigations are confidential by nature, as they
deal with sensitive information, with a relatively small num-
ber of individuals carrying out this work. This means that
there is a small pool of subjects to draw upon, in contrast
to domains such as general Web search, which is evident in
previous work [23]. This exploratory case study sheds light
on the relatively unexplored domain of Open-Source Intelli-
gence investigations.
Several research questions were explored in order to facil-
itate this research:
RQ1 How do analysts who conduct subject centric OSINT
investigations perform Web searches? What is their
process?
RQ2 Which types of information are they interested in?
What are they looking for?
RQ3 Which types of sources do they use to get this infor-
mation? Do they use any specialised tools to acquire
or manage this information?
RQ4 How do the needs of these OSINT investigators com-
pare to those of searchers in other domains?
3.1 Capturing Analyst Behaviour
The executive interview provided an understanding of the
overall business practices of the company, which types of
cases they investigate, and why. This also provided the con-
text in which to place the analyst’s search behaviour. Inter-
view discussion topics included the types of tasks analysts
undertake, how they generally approach the process and the
nature of the end-product deliverable.
Using this sketch of the problem space and processes, a
questionnaire was produced, which was used to guide semi-
structured interviews with the analysts, with each analyst
being interviewed in isolation. The questionnaire was de-
signed to establish how the analysts currently perform their
investigation, as well as which search techniques and tools
they utilise. This design attempts to address the axes of do-
main specific search as discussed in Hanbury [14]. Responses
were recorded by the researchers, allowing the analyst to fo-
cus on their reply.
3.2 Questionnaire Contents
The questionnaire utilised in the semi-structured analyst
interviews was comprised of the following sections.
Personal Background: This section contained questions
relating to: demographics; education and employment his-
tory; and a self description of their current role.
Example Cases: The analysts were asked to describe three
investigations which they had conducted in the past. In or-
der to aid the analyst in spontaneously recalling a partic-
ular case, it was suggested that it could have been one of
the following: memorable, routine, challenging, unsuccess-
ful, or collaborative. Particular questions related to the high
level description of the case, what they were provided with
at the beginning, what their approach was, which sources
were used, how the information was corroborated, and what
challenges were encountered.
Case Generalisations: The analysts were asked to at-
tempt to describe cases in a more abstract way, generalising
from particulars to features which are common to most, or
all, investigations. They were also asked if there are any par-
ticular kinds of cases which do not fit the norm. This section
also attempted to associate value ranges to the number of
results examined, number of sources used, time spent for-
mulating queries, etc.
Types of Search: Analysts were asked about the various
types of search they perform and which sources they use
to get this information. Examples of the types of search
are: social media; geolocation/map; car/vehicle; news; and
multimedia.
Core Functionality: Core functionality includes search
operators and other features of a service, or search engine,
such as filtering, bookmarking, aggregation, or query ex-
pansion/suggestions. The analysts were asked which kinds
of functionality they make use of, or which they would find
useful, but do not necessarily make use of.
Other Tools and Services: This section pertained to any
software or resources the analysts used which were external
to the Web, such as software tools for case management,
analysis, visualisation, or report generation.
Investigative Process: The interviewees were then asked
general questions on the investigative process, such as which
aspects of a case take the longest, or are repeated most often.
This section was also used to reflect/elaborate on, as well as
confirm our understanding of, the processes and techniques
which had been described in previous sections.
Features for Improvement: The final section involved
questions relating to any functionality which the analysts
thought would be useful as part of a hypothetical search
system.
4. FINDINGS
This section presents the findings of the exploratory study.
First, investigations are placed in context before describing
the process which is applied to all subject-centric investiga-
tions which are carried out by the analysts. Following this,
particular search behaviours are highlighted, with discus-
sion on the generic task which underlies the search process.
Specific di culties associated with these types of investiga-
tion are then presented. Finally, the search domain is sum-
marised in terms of the five axes of search in Hanbury and
Lupu [14].
Each case begins with a client requesting that a partic-
ular investigation be carried out, due to particular internal
flags being raised. The client provides a document, or, brief-
ing sheet, which describes the purpose of the investigation,
as well as known background details regarding the subject
of the investigation and any relevant context. This infor-
mation may vary depending on the particular context, as
well as what information is available to the client. However,
the briefing sheet typically includes items such as subject
name, date of birth, known address, telephone number, etc.
Where possible, the entire investigation is carried out us-
ing Web resources, however, when this proves insu cient,
costly physical surveillance may be employed in order to
gather further information. Physical surveillance operatives
are provided with updated information and pertinent find-
ing from the analyst’s online investigation, allowing them to
operate more e↵ectively. While physical surveillance is an
important part of the overall process, its impact on the Web
search process carried out by the analyst is limited. There-
fore, this research only focuses on the work carried out by
the analyst, who gathers information using Web resources.
An overview of the parties involved in the investigation, as
well as their relationships, can be found in Figure 1.
Each investigation is conducted by a single analyst, who
spends anywhere between two and eight hours gathering and
reporting information, a duration which is consistent with
intelligence analysts in Chin et al. (four to eight hours) [8]
and NATO’s OSINT guidelines (four hours) [22]. This work
need not be carried out on the same day2 and the overall du-
ration may vary in line with the profile of the case at hand.
Similarly, cases are typically not revisited once closed, how-
ever this is also subject to considerations of proportionality.
2
In some cases this was out of necessity, as one resource relating to
upcoming court cases only makes information available for a week in
advance of the court date. For this reason, this resource was checked
at regular intervals.
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Figure 1: The parties involved in the investigation and their relationships.
Both analysts interviewed were in the 50–60 age bracket,
one male, one female, both of whom have 30 years of ex-
perience in the police force. During their time with the
police, one analyst specialised in criminal intelligence, while
the other occupied several roles which leveraged their abil-
ity to locate persons of interest. Both analysts had been
working in their current role for 3–4 years at the time this
research was conducted. While neither analyst claimed to
have any extensive IT training, one analyst had previous
experience querying national law enforcement databases.
4.1 Process Overview
The approach to the investigation can be split into two
main search phases: Background Verification and Open-
Ended Web Search. The process involved in these search
stages is discussed in turn, before elaborating on the case
management and reporting processes.
Background Verification: In this stage, information pro-
vided on the briefing sheet is verified, updated and expanded
upon. The records provided by the client may be outdated
or erroneous; the subject may have moved residence or their
personal circumstances, such as employment or marital sta-
tus, may have changed. It is therefore critical for the inves-
tigation, as it moves forward, that this initial information
be scrutinised.
The defining characteristic of this stage is that the ana-
lysts make use of a small, relatively fixed, set of services in
order to verify this information. These sources are author-
itative, though not necessarily guaranteed to be accurate,
and, as such, are corroborated with each other.
Which sources are used will be dependant on the par-
ticular investigation. The most common services relate to
residence and property verification as well as car registration
checking. Cases with substantial corporate, financial or legal
elements will necessitate the consultation of services relat-
ing to corporate structures and company information; credit
checking; and information relating to previous convictions,
respectively.
Open-Ended Web Search: The verified briefing sheet
from the Background Verification stage is then used as seed
information for the open-ended portion of the investigation.
This stage still makes use of a small set of pre-defined re-
sources, but the goal is to learn new things about the subject
beyond simple information which could be held in a reg-
istry database. This includes utilising resources relating to
news, e-commerce and multimedia, but places a particularly
strong emphasis on social media and general Web search.
Social media platforms, such as www.facebook.com, www.
myspace.com, www.bebo.com and www.twitter.com, play a
large role in the majority of these subject-centric investi-
gations as they allow for individuals to express themselves
openly. In particular, there is the potential to gather infor-
mation directly pertaining to the investigation, either from
the subject themselves, or their relations. The leading Web
search engine is utilised as a portal to the wider Web, al-
lowing for the gathering of new information from previously
unknown sources. Search engines are typically utilised after
the social media gathering phase. One analyst noted that,
occasionally, competing Web search engines are used, with
one competitor being cited as producing more up to date
results for Internet news articles.
The open-ended search phase constitutes the bulk of the
investigation, with the majority of this time being spent
using search engines to find new pieces of information. It
should also be noted that the stages are not entirely inde-
pendent, as some information discovered in the latter stage
may inspire new information to be sought, or verified, us-
ing services from the Background Verification portion of the
investigation.
Case Management and Reporting: The analysts were
not found to use any specialised software throughout the
investigation, utilising a Web browser as the primary tool,
with a popular rich text editor serving as a means of man-
aging and reporting findings. A PDF file is generated from
this text editor as part of the final report, which is used
in conjunction with a Customer Relationship Management
(CRM) system.
Rather than drawing conclusions in the report, the infor-
mation found throughout the investigation is presented as is,
with the client being left to interpret the findings and deter-
mine a course of action. That is not to say that the findings
are presented in isolation, with one interviewee noting that
information is qualified in order to acknowledge that it is fal-
lible. For instance, there may be a chance that the informa-
tion found belongs to an individual other than the subject of
the investigation, as they happen to share names and cities.
These qualifications, then, allow for various weights to be
assigned to pieces of evidence, based on the degree of cor-
roborating information. The second interviewee noted that
the word ‘fact’ is not appropriate when referring to findings,
instead, opting to use the term ‘indicator’.
One reason that no specialised case management or re-
porting facilities are utilised is that, typically, only a small
number of relevant documents are found for a given inves-
tigation. Hence, there is not a large volume of information
to manage at the report level. The report typically con-
sists of highly relevant nuggets of information, with asso-
ciated source URLs, screenshots and analyst notes (quali-
fications, context). However, one analyst refrains from in-
cluding screenshots of Web pages in reports out of concern
that copyright will be infringed upon were it to be included.
Neither query logs nor visited Web pages are logged to in-
clude in the report, with viewed documents/sources only
being included in the report when relevant information is
found. That is, there is no strict auditing requirement in
place, with only information which is relevant to the case
being reported, together with its source.
4.2 Analyst Search Behaviour
Verification Tasks: In the Background Verification stage
much of the searching is simply rote querying of services
with existing information in order to verify its veracity. The
same query is repeated to several di↵erent services in order
to compare, contrast, and corroborate the results. How-
ever, in some cases, this core information is what is actually
sought after by the client. An example of this would be if
an individual accumulated a large amount of debt before ab-
sconding, with the task of the analyst being to locate this
individual. The context then shifts, such that the focus of
the investigation is on discovering this fundamental infor-
mation, with much greater feedback between the two stages
of the investigation.
Both analysts demonstrated a preference for free services
over paid services when verifying background information.
One interviewee described a micro-transactional process in
which small pieces of information, given at no cost by var-
ious services, are posed as queries to other services in or-
der to gather di↵erent pieces of free information. By using
this iterative querying process, these free pieces of informa-
tion can be expanded upon, and combined, forming a more
complete picture while simultaneously avoiding the need for
payment. This, of course, inflates the number of queries
and places more load on the analyst, with much repetition
of query terms across related services.
Open-Ended Searching: Di↵ering strategies were adopted
by each analyst in the second phase of the investigation.
The first analyst treated social media searching as an in-
termediate between the Background Verification and Open-
Ended Web Search stages, as it potentially enables the cor-
roboration of information such as employment status, mar-
ital status, and location. The general Web search process
adopted is an experimental one, a ‘random, calculated, Web
search’ in which the subject’s name is leveraged as the pri-
mary source of query content. Queries are submitted and
reformulated at will, with no significant formulation period.
Results are then assessed for relevance using background
knowledge, previous findings and contextual clues. A rela-
tively small number of documents were viewed by this ana-
lyst, numbered in the tens, rather than hundreds per query,
indicating a high degree of discrimination of the results. No
particular use was made of advanced query formulation tech-
niques, which the interviewee attributed to a personal lack
of skill in this area.
The second analyst also placed a similar emphasis on the
importance of social media, however it was not described in
terms of an intermediate step in the investigation. Queries
posed to general search engines were described as simply
containing ‘the basics’, that is, the types of information
found on the analyst’s briefing sheet. In this case, a larger
emphasis is placed on an exhaustive search methodology of
the results lists. Initially, approximately 15 pages of results
are assessed for each query. If this initial assessment does
not yield relevant results, then an iterative process is em-
ployed for each query, delving deeper into the results lists
in the search for small pieces of relevant information. In
this case, hundreds of results, across tens of results pages,
may be scrutinised. That is, while the first analyst is more
query orientated, the latter analyst is more document ori-
entated. Additionally, while the first analyst made no use
of advanced query functionality, the second interviewee ex-
pressed knowledge of boolean operators and phrase queries,
as well as indicating an interest in learning more about ad-
ditional operators. This analyst also placed some emphasis
on the use of image and reverse image searching. One exam-
ple given involved the utilisation of a reverse image search
engine, which was used in order to scrutinise a social media
profile image. From the results, it was discovered that the
profile image was a stock photograph, which suggested that
the account in question was a fabrication.
In neither case was there a well defined stopping point
identified for the gathering of information. In cases where
evidence is found, the analysts appear to use their own
judgement regarding how much evidence is enough. This
judgement is based on what has been looked at already, what
has been found and how well the primary task has been ad-
dressed. In some cases, evidence may be hard to locate, as
it may be found deep down in the search results, hosted on
obscure sources. This problem may be exaggerated if little
initial information is provided, or if findings are poor during
the Background Verification stage of the investigation. How-
ever, once an investigative thread is discovered in a new piece
of relevant information, new lines of investigation open up,
facilitating the discovery of yet more relevant nuggets. That
is, once a ‘foothold’ is obtained, the remainder of the inves-
tigation tends to progress more smoothly. For cases where
this investigative stagnation is not overcome, the search is
carried on until the rough cut o↵ point of eight hours, out of
concern for due diligence. One analyst noted that such cases
may be revisited at a later date, during periods of lower work
loads.
Both analysts voiced concerns regarding the reliability of
information, though their general approaches di↵ered. One
interviewee accepted most information at face value, unless
there was a reason to think that the information was not to
be trusted. These reliability determinations were made us-
ing personal experience and background knowledge, as well
as other pieces of information/context from the case. Partic-
ular types of information were emphasised as being partic-
ularly unreliable, such as social media relationship statuses
and potential terms of endearment. The second intervie-
wee was generally more sceptical of all information until it
was corroborated in some way. Again, an example of a po-
tentially unreliable source of information was given in news
Table 1: Comparison of analyst behaviours.
Search Strategy Adv. Features Reliability Digital Footprint Reporting
A
n
a
ly
st
1 – Query orientated.
– Experimental
queries.
– Discriminatory when
examining docu-
ments.
– None used. – Generally taken at
face value unless sus-
picious.
– Wary of particular
types of information.
– Uses services requir-
ing user accounts if
known to be safe.
– Screenshots, quali-
fiers, URLs.
A
n
a
ly
st
2 – Document orien-
tated.
– Examines many doc-
uments per query.
– Some use of boolean
operators and phrase
queries.
– Reverse image
searching.
– Generally sceptical.
– Distinction between
‘facts’ and ‘reported
facts’.
– Categorically avoids
services which re-
quire user accounts.
– Descriptive notes,
qualifiers and URLs.
– ‘Indicators’ as op-
posed to ‘facts’.
media, with a distinction being made between ‘facts’ and
‘reported facts’, citing media ‘sensationalism’ as a potential
problem.
A recurring concern was that of the digital footprint left
behind by an online investigation, which plays a particularly
large role when social media resources are utilised. One ana-
lyst categorically avoids using services which require user lo-
gins/accounts, while the other only does so when it is known
that the subject will be unable to detect their use of the ac-
count. This can be a problem for social media platforms
such as www.linkedin.com and www.keek.com, as well as
dating sites such as www.match.com, as they actively notify
the account holder when their profiles has been viewed. The
primary reason for avoiding this sort of interaction is that
it may compromise the investigation; tipping o↵ the subject
allows them to change their behaviour, which may be detri-
mental to the case. The integrity of the investigation must
be preserved, not just operationally, but also ethically. It
was stressed, by both the executive and analysts, that only
publicly available information was to be used throughout the
investigation. That is, it is completely out of the question,
to, say, send the subject a friend request on a social media
platform for the purposes of bypassing privacy restrictions.
Neither analyst indicated that they use any tools which
automate search tasks, nor do they make use of meta-search
engines which automatically pose a single query to multiple
services. A single aggregation service was cited, pertaining
to announcements relating to deaths, marriages, birthdays
and other personal or family events. Additionally, some ref-
erence was made to services which facilitate the identifica-
tion of a particular individual’s social media profiles, as they
may not necessarily directly contain the individual’s given
name. Table 1 summarises and contrasts the behaviour of
both analysts.
4.3 The Underlying Task
Not only is the high level process fixed across the various
investigation types, but the underlying task is as well. That
is, the analyst seeks to discover small pieces of information
relating to the subject, building a network of inter-related
informational items. These pieces of information potentially
pertain to: relationships, associations/memberships, loca-
tions, subject attributes, interests, hobbies and other con-
textual information. In essence, these small pieces of infor-
mation are the operating unit of the investigation, allowing
the investigation to progress as well as serving as evidential
items in the report.
These informational units are used in two ways. The first
is to expand the investigation, using pieces of information
to generate new query terms, or to give clues as to possi-
ble areas of exploration, taking the investigation in a new
direction. One example of this may be the discovery that
the subject plays, or has previously played, on a darts team.
The analyst can then use darts or darts team as new query
terms in conjunction with the subject’s name or location.
This could lead to the discovery of a locally managed darts
league, or event, which lists the subject as a participant.
The impact of this information varies depending on the par-
ticular investigation, however it may be especially relevant if
the investigation pertains to an injury which would prevent
the suspect from participating in such physical activities.
The second way in which these pieces of information can
be used is to narrow, or focus, the investigation. The same
piece of information may be used to provide filtering op-
portunities in order to better weed out irrelevant results, or
to disambiguate person namesakes in the results. A triv-
ial example of this is the discovery that the subject lives in
London, which, at least generally, allows for the filtering of
persons living in Amsterdam. These pieces of information
can also provide context for existing documents, enabling
better extraction of information or more e cient relevance
determinations at the document level. Additionally, cross-
referencing information allows the analyst to better under-
stand, and better utilise, previous findings. One example
given was the use of a social media post about dog walk-
ing, which contained an image of the subject’s partner. By
scrutinising this image, and cross-referencing it with other
resources, the analyst was able to determine an approximate
postcode of where the image was taken. This postcode even-
tually led to the discovery of the location of the subject,
successfully ending the investigation.
4.4 Difficulties
Person disambiguation was a concern for both analysts, as
it is not always straightforward to identify a namesake given
the available information, or context. In most cases, a claim
that a particular piece of information, or social profile, is
related to the subject, requires qualification due to the un-
certainty involved. Various levels of confidence can be placed
in this assertion, depending on the degree to which other ev-
idence corroborates it. For instance, a social media profile
which uses the subject’s name may contain a profile image of
a person in front of a place of residence. This profile image
can then be corroborated with geographical images found
on a popular publicly available satellite image provider, in
order to provide support that the individual in the image is
the subject, or a personal relation. This knowledge can then
be used to corroborate or contextualise further pieces of in-
formation. Similarly, if the same images or other contextual
clues are present across various social media platforms, it
is likely that the accounts belong to the same individual.
The use of these contextual clues, in concert with human
judgement and experience, appears to play a key role in the
process of person disambiguation, and, indeed, in determin-
ing the reliability of any piece of information.
A related problem is that of name variants, be they collo-
quial derivatives, erroneous spellings, nicknames, pet names
or even simply the favouring of a middle name over a first
name. Both analysts noted that this is not entirely uncom-
mon, with one example being given of a court document
which had incorrectly transcribed the subject’s name. In
cases where name variants are used, information may simply
be missed. The alternative is an increased load on the ana-
lyst as many more queries are generated in order to compen-
sate for poor findings. This problem may be compounded
when Web services require payment per query, though, as
previously noted, these services are not favoured by the in-
terviewees.
In addition to concerns relating to digital footprints, so-
cial media platforms also present challenges for information
acquisition, as users are typically able to control to which
degree their information is accessible. That is, when the
service allows it, they may opt to make their information
visible only to friends, or friends of friends, rather than the
general public. In these cases, rather than obtaining in-
formation from the subject’s profile directly, it is obtained
laterally, via social media relations, such as friends or family,
who may not operate with the same level of discretion. One
analyst suggested that this lateral acquisition occurs more
often than not, emphasising the importance of mapping out
the social relations of the subject.
When asked how a hypothetical system could improve the
overall process, suggestions included aid for the above tasks
of person disambiguation, name variant querying and lateral
social media information gathering. However, the overall
onus for improvement was on improving the general Web
search process, as conducted via the leading Web search
engine. The most time consuming portions of the inves-
tigation involve reviewing results, identifying relevant docu-
ments, reading documents and extracting information from
them, i.e. the information foraging loop in Pirolli and Card
[23]. As such, streamlining this Open-Ended Web Search
phase has the most potential to reduce the overall cost of
the investigation. The precision of the results seems to be
the primary factor, with the extraction of key pieces of in-
formation being the priority. Increasing precision would not
only reduce the time spent finding and extracting relevant
information but would also reduce the time spent on in-
vestigative stagnation, where new leads are not presenting
themselves. One analyst succinctly described the ideal sys-
tem as one which facilitates ‘minimum time in for maximum
information out’, i.e. one which maximises utility.
4.5 Domain Specific Search Summary
The following is a summary of the findings of this research
in terms of the five axes of domain specific search found in
Hanbury and Lupu [14].
Users: Both analysts interviewed were ex-police o cers
with 30 years of service each – with specialisations in crim-
inal intelligence and finding persons of interest. Neither an-
alyst possesses advanced information technology skills, in-
stead leveraging their extensive experience and ability to
utilise contextual clues and links between information.
Tasks: In subject-centric online investigations, the task is
to associate di↵erent pieces of information with the sub-
ject, with the process being divided into two main stages:
Background Verification and Open-Ended Web Search. Ver-
ification sub-tasks involve assessing the accuracy of funda-
mental information, such as: name, address, date of birth,
telephone number, marital status, employment status, etc.
In the Open-Ended Web Search phase, analysts seek new
pieces information, such as interpersonal relations, hobbies,
interests, associations, and activities. This information can
then be used to address the primary goal of the case. The
focus of the investigation may shift, depending on the rea-
son for which it is being conducted. For example, corporate
embezzlement investigations will have a di↵erent focus than
those pertaining to employee background vetting or fraud.
Subject Area: A wide range of open data sources are
utilised, such as: Web search engines; social media plat-
forms; database resellers, such as the electoral roll or vehicle
registration information; property information; e-commerce
and credit checking services; public record corporate infor-
mation; news and legal archives; social announcements; and
map/geolocation services. However, in practice, any OSINT
resource may be utilised, with the scope being limited only
by the task at hand.
Media: No particular limitations are placed on the types of
media used in the investigation. Examples were given which
involved text, image, video, and audio files, suggesting that
analysts make use of a wide variety of media types.
Tools: The primary tool used by the analysts was a Web
browser, with a text editor and a CRM system being utilised
for the purpose of reporting findings and case management.
No particular browser add-ons or extensions appear to be
used, with the use of advanced query functionality being
minimal. The Web browser is used as mechanism for ac-
cessing a variety of sources, as discussed in the Subject Area
section above.
Several potential leverage points were identified which may
be addressed at the software level: person disambiguation;
name variants; repeat queries; lateral information gathering
of social media platforms; results precision; and information
extraction.
5. DISCUSSION
While these subject centric investigations possess proper-
ties of exhaustive searches, the huge volume of documents
available on the Web make finding all information relating
to a subject impractical. This means that, in contrast to
patent searching [17] and E-Discovery [2], high recall is not
as critical as high precision, since the goal is to find a small
number of highly relevant documents in a large number of
results. Therefore it is appropriate to characterise this do-
main in terms of exploratory searching, rather than exhaus-
tive searching, using the definitions in Hogan et al [15]. That
is, the analyst is attempting to find information about the
subject but does not necessarily know in advance what may
be useful, nor is there a requirement that all pieces of in-
formation be found. While there are no legal repercussions
for failing to find documents, as there may be in the patent
searching domain [17], there may be other costs. For exam-
ple, the client may su↵er a loss of reputation in a scandal
relating to an employment decision, or be forced to pay large
insurance settlements. Some degree of personal investment
in the search is also apparent, as old cases with little informa-
tion are occasionally revisited, despite the lack of necessity
to do so.
As with E-Discovery searching [2] and intelligence analysis
in Chin et al. [8], the Open-EndedWeb Search phase appears
to be non-linear in nature. Findings discovered may prompt
new lines of investigation, with new queries, which divert
the analysts’ attention from the original search.
It is clear that the interviewees demonstrate domain ex-
pertise, rather than general search expertise. The analysts
do not appear to use advanced search features more often
than the average Web user, though they do view more pages
of results [20, 25]. However, as with domain experts in
Bhavnani [4], the interviewees demonstrated the existence
of a high level structure in their overall investigative pro-
cess, while also making use of pre-defined, authoritative, do-
main specific resources. Similarly, the general preference for
avoiding commercial sites is consistent with domain expert
behaviour in White et al [30].
In contrast to the intelligence analysts in Pirolli and Card
[23], the report produced by the interviewees does not con-
tain hypotheses or conclusions. However, it is possible that
hypotheses are represented internally to some degree in or-
der to facilitate the cross-referencing of pieces of information
and to provide a contextual framework for the investigation.
The lack of explicit hypotheses suggests that a bottom-up
approach is taken, although in some circumstances, the case
provided by the client may warrant a top-down approach.
In this latter case, the client may wish to identify a particu-
lar type of behaviour, such as embezzlement or fraud, such
that an explicit hypothesis is given from the outset.
Parallels can be drawn to intelligence analyst behaviour in
Chin et al. [8]. Firstly, the interviewees did not make any use
of particularly specialised tools, instead opting to use only
a Web browser and text editor in order to search, manage
and create reports for the case. Secondly, the interviewees’
approach to the reliability of information is consistent with
two of the analysts in Chin et al [8]: the first being generally
accepting unless there is a reason to think otherwise; and the
second being generally more sceptical of information until it
is corroborated. In all cases, there is a similar reluctance to
attribute the concept of a“concrete truth” [8] to the findings,
instead opting to qualify fallible findings.
While all interviewees possessed a strong desire to min-
imise their digital footprint during the investigation, the pri-
mary means of e↵ecting this was to avoid the use of services
which require accounts, or those which could unintentionally
communicate with the subject. Neither IP address obfusca-
tion or cookie management presented themselves as issues
to the interviewees. The NATO OSINT [22] handbook gives
suggestions for minimising the digital footprint of the inves-
tigation by making use of proxy services and engaging in
cookie management. The reasoning is that a high volume of
searches relating to a particular individual/group, such as
a terrorist or dictator, may be noticed and have an impact
on the investigation. However, it may be unreasonable to
expect that the subjects of investigations carried out by the
interviewees would have the resources necessary to acquire
this information via tra c analysis, meaning that they may
be justified in their current behaviour.
The freshness of the information was not a primary con-
cern for the interviewees, with information which is weeks,
or even months, old being useful. This is in contrast to a
large number of use cases for Open-Source Intelligence gath-
ering which rely on the immediacy of the information, such
as real time event monitoring, news summarisation or crisis
management. That is not to say that the interviewees were
completely unconcerned with the recency of documents, as a
competing search engine was cited as being potentially more
up to date when searching for Internet news articles.
6. SUMMARY
This work presented the findings from a study of a partic-
ular sub-domain of OSINT investigations, relating to sub-
ject centric investigations. Several research questions were
considered in order to ground this research. In relation to
RQ1, it was found that the search process is comprised of
two main stages: Background Verification and Open-Ended
Web Search. This process overview, in conjunction with a
deeper analysis of how they conduct each stage addressed the
search questions in RQ2. Analysts search for small pieces
of information which relate to the subject, ranging from so-
cial relations and hobbies to employment history and res-
idence, in order to conduct a wide variety of investigation
types. While no specialised software tools were found to
be used to carry out searching and reporting, or facilitate
case management, a variety of Web service archetypes have
been identified as being used frequently, addressing RQ3.
Finally, RQ4 is explored by contrasting this domain to pre-
vious work. This showed that the analysts exhibit behaviour
consistent with experts in other domains, and approach ev-
idential reliability in a similar manner to national security
intelligence analysts.
Several di culties were identified with this type of inves-
tigation, involving name variants, person disambiguation,
digital footprints, social media information access, and large
volumes of search engine results. The findings from this
research are significant in so far as they provide insight
in to the overall behaviour and search needs of these ana-
lysts. Further research could investigate practical solutions
for tackling these di culties, in order to better facilitate
these types of investigations. Additional work could expand
on the OSINT search domain in order to provide insight into
other use cases, such as those pertaining to natural disaster
response and humanitarian aid, or investigations pertaining
to groups of people, rather than individuals. This may lead
to the discovery that certain elements of the investigation
are common across the entire OSINT domain, or that tech-
niques utilised in domains with similar characteristics could
be adapted for OSINT purposes.
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